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RECENT CASE NOTES
was a contract may bring another action in quasi-contract. It is quite
clear that the action on contract might have been joined with the action
in quasi contract, both being "money demands on contract."17 The two
actions fall under the general heading "assumpsit." The probabilities are
that the new rule will be generally accepted since it is conducive to less
litigation. This new rule arises from a literal application of the orthodox
rule. The old rule was that a judgment concludes the parties not only as
to matters decided but also on all matters which might have been con-
sidered and decided.18 But this rule was applied only when the second
suit was on a part of the same cause of action as the first. Where the
second cause was different from the first, the judgment was conclusive
only as to those points or questions actually litigated and determined in
the original action, not what might have been litigated and determined.19
The new rule takes the phrase "what might have been litigated" and ap-
plies it absolutely literally. Every cause of action which might have been
adjudicated is barred. Thus quoting Professor Gavit in 6 Ind. L. J. 296.
30 Col. L. Rev. 820, "If a party might have amended; 20 might have
joined;21 might have answered by setting up a counterclaim ;22 might have
fused;23 he is now barred by the new doctrine of res judicata."
The Indiana case cited, Royal Ins. Co. v. Stewart, held that the judg-
ment in a prior legal action to recover on an insurance policy as it was
written barred an equitable action to reform said policy, and is thus con-
trary to the dictum in the instant case. S. K.
SCHOOLs-RACE SEGREGATION-CONSTrrTTIONAL LAw-Appellant, a next
friend of the relatrix, began suit in the Lake County superior court for
the purpose of mandating appellees either to reinstate relatrix in a cer-
tain named high school or to transfer and admit her "as a high school
pupil in one of the accredited high schools of the * * * school city of
Gary, Indiana." At the opening of schools of Gary in September, 1927,
relatrix enrolled as a pupil of the 10B grade (second year high school)
in Virginia Street school. On that date, this school was organized to offer
the eight years of grade work and two years of high school work. Shortly
after, all tenth grade work was discontinued in this school, and relatrix,
a member of the colored race, was transferred to Emerson High School.
Shortly thereafter, a large number of white pupils "struck" at Emerson
as a protest against the transfer of colored pupils to that school. The
school officials refused to make any changes at that time, and the strikers
returned to their classes. It is charged that they were induced to return
by the promise that the colored pupils would be removed within 90 days.
Within such period, relatrix was notified by the Gary superintendent of
,7 2S6 Burns, Hawke v. Thorn, 54 Barb (N. Y.) 164.
Is Wong Sun v. United State, 293 F. 273.
12 Cromwell v. County of Sao, supra, note 7.
2'Dodson v. Southern By. Co., 137 Ga. 583, 73 S. E. 534 (1912).21Royal Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 190 Ind. 444, 129 N. M. 353 (1921).
2Holman v. Tiosevig, 136 Wash. 261, 239 Pac. 545 (1925); Bates v. Bodie, 245
U. S. 520 (1913); Fairview Chase Corp. v. Schorf, 232 N. Y. S. 530; Gust v. Ed-
wards Co., 129 Ore. 409, 274 Pac. 914 (1929).
23Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N. Y. 109, 62 N. E. 135 (1901).
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schools to return to Virginia Street School after the Christmas holidays.
On refusal of the superintendent to admit relatrix to any school except
the Virginia Street school, this action was commenced apparently asking
that the appellees be mandated. The case was venued to Porter county and
judgment rendered for the defendants. Held, the transfer of relatrix to
another school was not illegal.'
4s early as 18492 it was decided that a school board had the power,
under the constitution and laws of Massachusetts, to make provision for
the instruction of colored children in separate schools established exclu-
sively for them, and to prohibit their attendance at schools maintained for
white children. 3  The fact that colored children must go a greater dis-
tance is immaterial.4 But in some states this is regarded as unreason-
able.5 If colored schools are not provided, colored children cannot be ex-
cluded from schools established for white children.6 Children of Chinese
parents may be classed under the "colored school" statutes, and given the
privilege of attending only schools provided for negroes.7 An act pro-
hibiting and imposing a punishment for maintaining and operating an in-
stitutiqn of learning in which white and colored persons may be taught
at the same time, and in the same place is a valid exercise of the police
power of a state,8 and is not a violation of equal protection of the law or
of due process of law.9 The right to teach white and negro children in
a private school at the same time and place is not a property right.lo An
act prohibiting maintenance of any institution of learning of separate and
distinct branches for white and colored persons less than twenty-five miles
distant from each other is unreasonable, and not within the police power
of the state."1 The classification of scholars on the basis of race or color,
and their education in separate schools involves questions of domestic
policy, which are within the legislative discretion and control, provided
that substantially equal facilities are furnished both races. This neither
violates Art. I, Sec. 23, of the Indiana Constitution, which declares, "the
general assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privi-
leges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong
to all citizens," nor the privileges and immunities clause of the Federal
Constitution, which applies only to action by the federal government, nor
with the Thirteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, this being no
servitude, nor with other clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.17
In 1867 appeared the first of the decisions sanctioning the segregation
1 State ex rel. Cheeks v. Wirt, Supreme Court of Indiana, July 21, 1931, 177
N. E. 441.
221 Illinois Law Review, p. 704 if.
3 Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. (Blass.) 198.
'Lehew v. Brummel, 103 Mo. 541, 15 S. W. 765.
S5 People v. Mayor of Alton, 193 II1. 309, 61 N. E. 1077.
'Wysinger v. Crookshank, 82 Cal. 588, 23 Pae. 54.
Gong Lum v. Rice, 48 Sup. Ct. 91.
9 Berea College v. Commonwealth, 94 S. W. (Ky.) 623; (affirmed) 211 U. S. 45.
Berea College v. Commonwealth, supra, note 8.
1
oBerea College v. Commonwealth, supra, note 8.
"
1Berea College v. Commonwealth, supra, note 8.
12 Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327. See, also, Martin v. Board of Education, 42 W.
Va. 515; Ohio v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 210; Cisco v. School Board, 161 N. Y. 598,
56 N. E. 81.
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of races in public conveyances. In the absence of statute, a railroad com-
pany has the right to segregate its white and colored passengers.' 3 Under
a state statute, a railroad company can provide for such segregation,14
but colored people cannot be denied the privilege of any dining or sleeping
cars.15
In a number of the foregoing decisions, the courts used the analogy,
in support of their decisions, of the statutes prohibiting inter-marriage of
races.' 6 Although there is a remote connection here, the cases seem
scarcely in point.
The civil right of a white man, however, to dispose of his property, if
he sees fit to do so, to a colored person, and of a colored person to make
such disposition to a white person cannot be violated by zoning laws.17
Property of a person cannot be taken without due process of law. How-
ever, the court could see no violation of the Fifth, Thirteenth, or Four-
teenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution in a decree of the Court
of Chancery which restrained a property owner from violating a private
contract by which he and other owners of certain contiguous parcels of
land had agreed with one another that none of such parcels should be sold,
leased or occupied by members of the colored race for a period of years,
because the Fifth Amendment limits only the powers of the general gov-
ernment, and not of individuals, the Thirteenth Amendment denounces
only involuntary servitude, and the Fourteenth Amendment refers only to
state action and not to that of individuals.'s No question of restraint on
alienation was raised here.19 However, restraints on alienation which are
total as to persons, but reasonably limited as to time have been upheld
when the question was raised,20 and others limited as to persons, and total
as to time have been upheld.21
While a legislature can pass laws providing for segregation of races in
the exercise of police power (with the exception of laws affecting rights
in real property), it cannot exclude a person or discriminate against him
totally because he is of another race. 22 In those cases cited referring to
so-called political rights, the person of another race may not have a right,2 3
(to serve on a jury), but he has an immunity from discrimination because
of his race. A state statute denying a colored person the right to vote in
13 Westchester Railway Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. St. 209, 93 Am. Dec. 747.
14Plessy v. Ferguson, 16 Sup. Ct 1138, 163 U. S. 537; Smith V. State, 100 Tenn.
494, 46 S. W. 566, 41 L. R. A. 432; Railway v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587; Railway
v. Kentucky, 179 U. Z. 392; Railway v. Commonwealth, 99 Ky. 663, 37 S. W. 79.
15 McCabe v. A. T. & S. F. By., 235 U. S. 151.
" State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 402; State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 177, 50 Am. Rep. 499;
State v. Hairston, 63 N. C. 453; Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 29 Am. Rep. 742;
Lonas v. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 309.
1TBuchanan v. Worley, 245 U. S. 60.
Is Corrigan v. Buckley, 46 Sup. Ct. 521.
19 21 Illinois Law Rev., supra, note 2.
2"Lawson v. Lightfoot, 84 S. W. 739.
2IQueeusborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641, L. R. A. 1916-3,
1201.
2 Davenport v. Cloverport, 72 Fed. 689; Strander v. West Virginia, 100 U. S.
303; Yfk Wo v. Hopkins, 113 U. S. 356; Wysinger v. Crookshank, supra,.note 6;
McCabe v. A. T. & S. F. By., 235 U. S. 151; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339.
2Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339.
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the Democratic primary election is in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution.24
The doctrine of the principal case is recognized by the overwhelming
weight of authority, and the principle of it seems to be reasonable and
correct. However, in writing its opinion, the court apparently assumed
in great measure, (quite properly enough), the constitutional background
of its decision. L.H.W.
N Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536.
LEGAL DIRECTORY
John K. Ruckelhaus, former deputy attorney general, has become a
member of the firm of Ryan and Ruckelhaus, attorneys, with offices in the
Indiana Trust Building, Indianapolis, Indiana.
John L. Duvall, former mayor of Indianapolis, has opened a law office
at 402 Castle Hall Building, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Harley F. Hardin, former Grant county prosecuting attorney, and
Thurman A. Biddinger, his former deputy, have formed a law partnership
to be known as Hardin & Biddinger, Marion, Indiana.
George F. Beeson has opened a law office at 50 New Washington Street,
Hagerstown, Indiana.
Judge Oren N. Heaton of Fort Wayne has moved his law office to 901
Old-First National Bank Building.
Porter Crowell has opened an office in Kendallville for the general
practice of law.
Solomon Segal has moved his office from Elwood, Indiana, to 309 I. 0.
0. F. Building, South Bend.
John B. Cockrum, former general attorney and solicitor of the Nickel
Plate and Lake Erie & Western Railroad, has entered into the private
practice of law with offices at 550 Consolidated Building, Indianapolis,
Indiana.
OBITUARIES
William W. Thornton, age 80, veteran lawyer, jurist, author and a
thirty-third degree Mason, died at his home in Indianapolis Thursday,
January 21, 1932. He had been engaged in the practice of law in Indian-
apolis 'for more than forty years and had served two terms as judge in
the Marion county superior court. He was a member of the Indiana and
Indianapolis Bar Associations and at the time of his death was dean of
the Benjamin Harrison Law School. Judge Thornton was the author of
many articles in legal periodicals and also of many legal books.
Frank B. Faris, age 37, member of the firm of Fields and Faris at
Bloomington, Indiana, died Thursday, January 28, 1932. Mr. Faris was
a member of the American Legion, First Presbyterian church, and Phi
Kappa Psi and Phi Delta Phi fraternities. He also was a member of the
Indiana State Bar Association and of the Monroe County Bar Association.
E. P. Richardson, age 84, died at his home in Petersburg, Indiana, Sun-
day, January 17, 1932. Mr. Richardson was the oldest member of the
Pike County Bar Association.
Cassius M. Greenlee, age 75, former city judge and prominent attor-
ney of Gary, died Sunday, February 7, 1932. Mr. Greenlee had been prac-
ticing law in Indiana for thirty years.
